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COMMENT
SEED BANKS AND THEIR SPROUTING NEED FOR STRICTER
CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A food crisis is looming.] By the year 2050, food production will
have to double to feed the world's growing population. 2 And yet, the
opposite is happening: crop yields are plateauing and the remaining
seed varieties are being consistently threatened by climate change, new
diseases, and shifts in agricultural practice by the use of genetically
modified organisms. 3 Thus, the less diversity we have in our food, the
more vulnerable our whole food system becomes. In other words, our
food supply hangs by a delicate vine of diverse varieties of seeds with
different types of genetic resistance, and therefore, the less seed
varieties we have, the weaker the vine.4
The preservation of diverse seed varieties is critical to ensuring the
world's food supply.5 If the global food supply becomes overly reliant
on just a few strains of crops, the destruction of that crop could amount
1. Charles Siebert, Food Ark, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (July 2011), http://ngm.na-
tionalgeographic.com/2011/07/food-ark/siebert-text.
2. Press Release, General Assembly, Food Production Must Double by 2050 to
Meet Demand from World's Growing Population, Innovative Strategies Needed to
Combat Hunger, Experts Tell Second Committee, U.N. Press Release GA/EF/3242
(Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. on Food Production].
3. Id.
4. Allyson Martin, Seed Savers V Monsanto: Farmers Need a Victory for Wilt-
ing Biodiversity, 24 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 95 (2013).
5. Darrel Shahan, Seed vaults help preserve nature, but at a price, ZANESVILLE
TIMES-RECORDER (Ohio) (Dec 30, 2015) http://www.zanesvil-
letimesrecorder.com/story/opinion/2015/12/30/seed-vaults-preserve-nature-
price/78096808/.
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to food desolation.6 This strategy of "putting all our eggs in one basket"
is one of dependency, and although this strategy is prevalent in many
facets of life, such a practice can have devastating effects on the food
industry. In the face of a rapidly changing world, food diversity
underpins today's food production and provides the raw materials
needed to ensure supplies continue tomorrow.7 Therefore, when it
comes to crops, seeds, and all other categories of food, diversity is
essential to food security.8
As such, seed diversity can be regarded as a type of insurance
policy.9 And yet, seed diversity is severely threatened by the evolution
of genetically modified plants, climate change, and disease.10 If trends
continue, food extinction will continue to worsen and potentially harm
all future generations, depriving them of a particular food variety that
will remain extinct forever.
The international community, through treaties and United Nations
General Assemblies, has recognized the problems and consequences
that accompany the world's agriculture depending on only some seed
varieties." Gradually, food security is now being addressed. For
example, the international community has established several
multilateral treaties to protect endangered organisms and encourage
States to share information about agriculture. 12 Other States have
mobilized billions of dollars towards food security solutions
customized for specific regions. 13 Some States and regions have also
taken additional efforts to protect food diversity by creating seed
6. See id.
7. Crop Diversity; Why it Matters, CROPTRUST, https://www.croptrust.org/our-
mission/crop-diversity-why-it-matters/ (last visited Nov 13, 2016).
8. Id.
9. Rachel Nuwer, The World's Most Endangered Food, BBC (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140401-the-worlds-most-endangered-food
[hereinafter Nuwer].
10. Sara Reardon, Climate Change Already Hurting Agriculture, SCIENCE Now
(May 5, 2011), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2011/05/climate-change-already-
hurting-agriculture [hereinafter Reardon].
11. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
CITES].
12. Id.; The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Ag-
riculture, Nov. 3, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-110 [hereinafter TPGRFA].
13. U.N. on Food Production, supra note 2.
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banks. 14 Seed banks are literally banks of seeds, designed to safely
store seed varieties for future needs.15
Perhaps the most prominent and ambitious example of these seed
banks is the Svalbard Global Seed Vault ("Svalbard"), created by
Norway, which preserves hundreds of thousands of seed varieties
originating from every corner of the globe.1 6 It is also commonly
referred to as the "Doomsday Vault" because it safeguards the most
expansive collection of seed varieties in the world, acting as a back-up
to the back-up plan.1 7 In fact, it has the capacity to hold 2.5 billion
seeds.18 States and institutions from across the globe voluntarily
deposit seeds into Svalbard, strictly for preservation and study, by
signing the "depositor agreement," which is a contract between the
depositor and Svalbard.19
In September 2015, only seven years after Svalbard's inception, the
International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas
("ICARDA") withdrew some of its donated seeds out of Svalbard. 20
ICARDA is an organization created to promote agricultural
development in dry areas in developing countries. 21 ICARDA initiated
Svalbard's inaugural withdrawal to replace seeds in its own research
facilities that the Syrian civil war destroyed. 22 Svalbard's depositor
agreement permitted ICARDA to unilaterally withdraw the Syrian
seeds.23
14. Agreement Between (Depositor) and The Royal Norwegian Ministry ofAg-
riculture and Food Concerning the Deposit of Seeds in the Svalbard Global Seed
Vault, http://www.nordgen.org/sgsv/scope/sgsv/files/SGSV _DepositAgreement.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Depositor Agreement].
15. What we Do, CROPTRUST, https://www.croptrust.org/what-we-do/svalbard-
global-seed-vault/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) [hereinafter CROPTRUST].
16. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14.
17. CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14.
20. Laura Wagner, Syrian Civil War Prompts First Withdrawal From Dooms-
day Seed Vault in the Arctic, NPR (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/thetwo-way/2015/09/23/442858657/syrian-civil-war-prompts-first-withdrawal-
from-doomsday-seed-vault-in-the-arctic [hereinafter Wagner].
21. Mission and Vision, ICARDA, http://www.icarda.org/mission-and-vision
(last visited Nov 13, 2016).
22. Wagner, supra note 20.
23. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14.
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This article argues Svalbard's depositor agreement should not
permit such liberal withdrawals. In order to facilitate Svalbard's goal,
the depositor agreement should have stronger contractual provisions
that limit States' abilities to withdraw seeds for foreseeable or State-
created disasters, particularly when the withdrawing State does not
intend to feed its population in times of need.24 As an alternative to
limiting withdraws, this article also argues the depositor agreement
should require States to forfeit property rights over the deposited seeds
as an explicit gift to humankind and future generations.25
Part II of this article reviews the rising threat of food extinction and
the development of seed banks across the world. Next, Part III
examines the specific provisions within Svalbard's depositor
agreement, which it uses with all of its seed contributors. Indeed, this
section will examine the consequences of Svalbard's current
nonrestrictive contract and propose stricter amendments to prevent non-
apocalyptic withdrawals, such as ICARDA's. Finally, Part IV
concludes by exploring additional obstacles seed banks face before they
can effectively combat the threat of food extinction.
II. SEED BANKS PROTECT SEEDS FROM EXTINCTION
Food extinction threatens the world's food security.26 Thus, as a
threat to the world, it is every citizen's and every State's responsibility
to help combat and prevent food extinction. Accordingly, Svalbard is
one defense that demonstrated the international community's harmony
by coming together to preserve seed diversity. However, Svalbard
should strengthen its depositor agreement to better facilitate food
security.
A. Food Extinction Threatens the Global Food Supply
The evolution of agricultural practices and constant climate change
continue to push plants and crops towards extinction. 27 Today's
industrialized agriculture replaces numerous seed strains with uniform
seeds, primarily to produce more of the same food at a faster
24. See infra Part III.B.1.
25. See infra Part III.B.2.
26. CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
27. Reardon, supra note 10
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pace. 28 Food companies and producers are streamlining crop varieties
to satisfy consumer demand for off-season fruits and vegetables. 2 9
Additionally, farmers are increasingly using fertilizers, which only
further threatens the remaining existence of certain foods. 30 The seeds
grow into crops and become increasingly dependent on chemical
fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. 31 As an adverse side effect,
fertilizers also breed resistance into weeds, insects, and diseases;
inadvertently strengthening those very dangers that threaten the
seeds. 32 The international community has recognized this movement
towards crop uniformity as a serious problem. In fact, the European
Union Commissioner has advocated stronger penalties in 2007 for
illegally growing genetically modified crops. 33
Seed extinction looms largely in our future because many seeds are
vulnerable to subtle changes in climate and land management; the
slightest misstep can cause permanent loss. 34 Seed extinction is not a
new problem. In fact, 75% of the world's seed diversity has already
been lost.3 5 For example, 86% of apple varieties once grown in the
United States are now extinct and permanently lost for future
generations. 36 China has lost 90% of the wheat varieties it cultivated
for 100 years. 37
The consequences of seed extinction extend beyond just the loss of
that seed; the extinction has a dangerous rippling effect throughout the
28. See Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of
Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000, at 68-69 (1988) [hereinafter Kloppenburg].
29. Id.
30. Commissioners Urge Reconsideration of Zero Tolerance GMO Policy,
INSIDEU.S.TRADE.com (Nov. 30, 2007), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/com-
missioners-urge-reconsideration-zero-tolerance-gmo-policy.
31. Keith Aoki, Malthus, Mendel, and Monsanto: Intellectual Property and the
Law and Politics of Global Food Supply: An Introduction, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
397, 402 (2004).
3 2. Id.
33. Commissioners Urge Reconsideration of Zero Tolerance GMO Policy, su-
pra note 30.
34. Tony Henderson, Rare North Plant Seeds Collected as Part of Global Con-
servation Plan, THE JOURNAL (Newcastle, U.K.) Nov. 28, 2015, at 18.
35. Nuwer, supra note 9.
3 6. Id.
37. Siebert, supra note 1.
852016]
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ecosystem. This same environmental effect is seen in the developing
endangerment of honeybees. Honeybees pollinate the fruits, nuts, and
crops that compromise the majority of our food.38 The honeybee
pollinates $5.7 to $19 billion worth of crops in the United States alone.3 9
The honeybees, however, are dying by the millions and becoming
endangered. 40 If they were to face extinction, the honeybee would not
exist to pollinate certain crops, leading to massive food loss and crop
disruption.41 Diluting seed diversity can cause similarly dismaying
consequences.
Seed diversity is crucial because it allows crops to adapt to changes,
and without that diversity it leaves the system exposed to
vulnerabilities. 42 For example, if only one variety of a seed exists, one
disease could wipe out that entire crop. On the other hand, if many
varieties of a crop exist, the disease is less likely to destroy each variety
because different varieties have different genetic strengths and
weaknesses. 43 Consequently, losing more seed varieties could lead to
a world food crisis without diversity working as an insurance policy."
For instance, 75% of the food consumed in the world is wheat, corn,
rice, and soybeans. 45 One disease or pest could severely devastate any
of these crops.46 Without seed diversity, the entire strain of crop may
be susceptible to the same pest or disease, potentially ruining 75% of
the global food supply. 47 This has already happened before, but on a
smaller scale.
The Irish potato famine of 1845 is perhaps the most well-known
example that demonstrates the severe repercussions that can arise from
38. Katheryn A. Peters, Keeping Bees in the City? Disappearing Bees and the
Explosion of Urban Agriculture Inspire Urbanites to Keep Honeybees: Why City
Leaders Should Care and What They Should Do About It, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 597,
604-05 (2012).
39. Id. at 605.
40. Emily Knobbe, Honeybees and the Law: Protecting Our Pollinators, 30 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 219, 220 (2015).
41. Id.; see generally Peters, supra note 38.
42. Nuwer, supra note 9.
43. See Siebert, supra note 1.
44. See Nuwer, supra note 9. See generally Martin, supra note 4.
45. Reardon, supra note 10.
46. See generally Martin, supra note 4.
47. Id.
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no seed diversity.48 At that time, Ireland's population relied on one type
of potato, the Irish Lumper. 49 When the potato blight hit, it caused
ecological disaster, entirely wiping out the Irish Lumper.50 Irish
farmers had no other crops to turn to because they depended on this one
type of crop, resulting in enormous human suffering and social
upheaval.5' The famine killed at least one million Irish people and
forced millions more to emigrate from Ireland to North America and
Australia. 52
A less popular but more recent epidemic highlighting the problems
behind the lack of seed diversity is the American corn blight of 1970.53
There, a fungus attacked American corn.54 About 15-20% of the total
corn crop was lost, with some "losses in the Gulf states running as high
as 50%."ss The National Academy of Sciences conducted a study after
this agricultural tragedy and found American crops were dangerously
uniform in genetic terms, causing them to be remarkably vulnerable. 56
B. Food Extinction is Everyone's Problem to Address
One main concern for almost every environmental issue in
international law is assigning responsibility to find a solution. 57
Ultimately, the grave challenge of preserving food and seed diversity is
every State's responsibility.5 8  Through treaties and international
48. Eric Christensen, Genetic Ark: A Proposal to Preserve Genetic Diversityfor
Future Generations, 40 STAN. L. REV. 279, 286 (1987).
49. Id.; Nuwer, supra note 9.
50. Christensen, supra note 48, at 286.
51. Nuwer, supra note 9.
52. Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M&M Produce Farms & Sales, 35 F. Supp. 2d 313,
316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
53. Christensen, supra note 48, at 286.
54. Id.
5 5. Id.
56. Keith Aoki, Farming and Food: How We Grow What We Eat: Article: Seeds
Of Dispute: Intellectual-Property Rights And Agricultural Biodiversity, 3 GOLDEN
GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 135 (2009).
57. David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 619, 652 (1994).
58. See Shanhan, supra note 5.
872016]
8
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 1 [2017], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol47/iss1/4
88 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
conventions, international law dictates that every State has the duty to
combat extinction, specifically extinction of seed varieties. 59
The Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
("TPGRFA"), ratified by 140 States, recognizes the international
community's shared responsibility to protect food diversity.60 The
TPGRFA facilitates the exchange of seeds and other information about
the world's food genetic diversity, stimulating essential research for the
development of climate-smart seeds and agriculture, and, thus,
ultimately striving for food security. 61 Primarily, the TPGRFA
identifies States' interdependency when it comes to food supply, in
conjunction with increasing awareness of health and environmental
concerns associated with food production. 62
Further, the U.N. General Assembly considers food as a legacy of
mankind that is passed from generation to generation.63 States should
thus use this cultural legacy of food for the benefit of all humanity and
not restrict it for the benefit of territorial boundaries. 64 Thus,
international cooperation is essential to protect seed diversity, and all
States are equally suited as guardians. 65
Unfortunately, some States have interpreted their sovereign
ownership of wildlife and food resources as having the right to benefit
from natural resources without acknowledging the duty and
responsibility of conservation.66 This narrow interpretation, however,
fails to acknowledge the responsibilities that are inherent in ownership
of such resources and contradicts existing international efforts to
preserve wildlife as established by the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"). 67
59. See'generally CITES, supra note 11, at preamble; TPGRFA, supra note 12.
60. See TPGRFA, supra note 12.
61. Id.
62. Muriel Lightbourne, The FAO Multilateral System for Plan Genetic Re-
sources for Food and Agriculture: Better than Bilateralism?, 30 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL'Y 465, 468 (2009).
63. Dr. Prado, Address at the U.N. General Assembly First Committee (Nov. 1,
1967), U.N. DOc. A/C.1/PV1515.
64. Id.
65. CITES, supra note 11, at preamble.
66. Michael C. Blum & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, UTAH L.
REv. 1437, 1440 (2013).
67. Id.; CITES, supra note 11.
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This interpretation also undermines the effectiveness of global
conservation efforts because such environmental measures should be
based on international consensus. 68
Indeed, international law requires people and States to respect
nature. First, the "right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural
wealth and resources," as the U.N. General Assembly stated, "is
inherent in their sovereignty." 69 This right, however, is not absolute,
and therefore, States may not act solely in self-interest. 70 Second, the
U.N. General Assembly continues to recognize the importance of
protecting natural global resources, which everyone shares (for
example the deep-sea bed). 71 Third, the U.N. General Assembly noted
that a State's development and use of its resources must facilitate
positive economic growth and encourage cooperation in international
trade.72
Furthermore, international law is trending towards providing every
individual the right to access food. For example, The International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR")
provides that every citizen of the world has the right to strive for a
healthy life in harmony with nature. 73 Thus, although States maintain
absolute sovereignty over their wildlife, international law has
established a transboundary respect for natural resources that may limit
a State's absolute sovereign power.74 The international community's
focus is moving towards examining the benefits and consequences a
State's action has on the world.
68. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on En-
vironment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1 [hereinafter Rio Dec-
laration].
69. G.A. Res. 626 (VII) (Dec. 21, 1952).
70. Covey, T. Oliver, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-
1954 Term, 15 LA. L. REv. 489 (1955) (reviewing ROBERT R. WILSON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD IN TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES (1953)).
71. See G.A. Res. 626 (VII) (Dec. 21, 1952).
72. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), at 24 (Dec. 17, 1970).
73. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 12,
Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Rio Declaration, supra note 68;
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 255 (2d Cir. 2003).
74. See G.A. Res. 626 (VII) (Dec. 21, 1952).
892016]
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The responsibility to protect seed diversity falls upon all States and
Svalbard is an example of Norway's effort to prevent seed extinction.75
It preserves a diverse variety of seeds from all over the world, without
concern for jurisdiction, in case a State permanently loses seed varieties
unique to its territory. 76 Svalbard's depositor contract, however, can be
improved to better preserve these unique seed varieties.77
C. The Svalbard Global Seed Vault is one Method to
Combat Food Extinction
As a response to rapidly dwindling seed diversity, scientists have
begun to gather and safely store samples of remaining seeds before they
disappear forever.78 This, in effect, is the practice of seed banks. In
1962, Russian botanist Nikolay Vavilov first conceived the idea of seed
banks. 79 He grew up in a poor, Russian village that was habitually
afflicted by famine and crop failure.80 At a young age, he became
infatuated with the goal to end famine in both his home and the rest of
the world.81
In the 1920s and 1930s, he dedicated his life to collecting seeds
from the wild varieties of the crops humans consume. 82 He did this to
preserve the strong gene characteristics that could survive nature's
threats, for example seeds that had disease, pest, or climate-resistant
genes. 83 Vavilov eventually directed an institute tasked with preserving
his flourishing seed collection. 84 His institute, located in St. Petersburg,
evolved into the first global seed bank and is now called the Research
Institute of Plant Industry.85
75. Siebert, supra note 1.
76. CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
77. See infra Part III.
78. Siebert, supra note 1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Stephen B. Brush, Biodiversity, Biotechnology, And The Legal Protection
Of Traditional Knowledge: Protecting Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, 17
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 59, 61 (2005); Siebert, supra note 1.
85. Siebert, supra note 1.
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Svalbard is not the only humanitarian effort to conserve food
diversity, but it is arguably the best equipped to combat food
extinction.86 Over 1,700 gene banks collect seeds for preservation, yet
many of the other banks are vulnerable because they are ill-equipped to
combat natural disaster or conflict in their locations.87 Something as
nonthreatening as a broken freezer can ruin the entire contents of some
seed storage facilities, potentially resulting in entire strains of seeds
disappearing like the dinosaurs.88 Therefore, despite the number of
seed banks around the world, Svalbard is considered the ultimate
backup for all other banks because it is well-funded, secure, and
isolated. 89
When the international community began discussing the danger to
seed diversity, Norway emerged as one of the few trustworthy and
dependable locations to hold such a significant seed storage. 90 In
February 2008, Wangari Maathai, a Nobel laureate and Kenyan
environmental activist, deposited the first samples into Svalbard; a box
of rice seeds.91 Following this initial deposit, countries ranging from
the United States to North Korea decided to deposit back-up samples of
their most rare seeds into Svalbard.92
The Government of the Kingdom of Norway owns Svalbard and it
is located in Longyearbyen, Svalbard. 93 The facility juts out of a
mountainside in Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago near the North
Pole.94 Norway chose its frigid location deliberately because of the cold
temperatures within the mountain. In the case of an electricity failure
within Svalbard, the natural cold temperatures could preserve the seeds
86. Shahan, supra note 5.
87. CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
88. Id.
89. Shahan, supra note 5.
90. Suzanne Goldenberg, The Doomsday Vault: The Seeds that Could Save a
Post-Apocalyptic World, THE GuARDIAN (May 20, 2015), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/science/2015/may/20/the-doomsday-vault-seeds-save-post-apocalyptic-
world.
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id.
93. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14.
94. Nuwer, supra note 9.
912016]1
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for decades. 95 The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food
("Norwegian Ministry") owns and operates Svalbard and The Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation largely funds Svalbard to permanently
protect agricultural and plant biodiversity. 96
Svalbard currently contains 860,000 seeds and counting, coming
from across the world without regard to political boundaries or
international politics.9 7 The seeds originate from almost every State in
the world and more than 60 institutions." When seeds arrive to
Svalbard, they enter the entrance hall on a seed trolley and are brought
down into the mountain through a 100-meter long tunnel.99 After
scientists label the seeds in the main chamber, they place the seeds on
the shelves in the main vault room.100 Genetically modified organisms
are only allowed in Svalbard after meticulous evaluation. After passing
several tests, those genetically modified seed samples are carefully
sealed and isolated to prevent the spread of genetic modification to
other seed samples in Svalbard. 0 '
Svalbard, like all other seed banks, is not perfect. First, Svalbard's
depositor agreement does not legally protect the seeds from arbitrary
withdrawals. 102 Second, seed banks, even ones as expansive as
Svalbard, have neither the space nor the resources to preserve myriad
foods of the entire world. 103 Third, the seeds are stored in conditions
where they can remain stable, but this is problematic because the seeds
95. Id.; FAQ About the Seed Vault, CROPTRUST, https://www.crop-
trust.org/what-we-do/svalbard-global-seed-vault/faq-about-the-vault/ (last visited
Mar. 11, 2016) [hereinafter FAQ About the Seed Vault].
96. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14.
97. Nuwer, supra note 9; CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
98. CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
99. FAQ About the Seed Vault, supra note 95.
100. Id.
101. Victoria Russo, Five Global Seed Banks that are Protecting Biodiversity,
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE BLOG (Oct. 12, 2013), http://blogs.worldwatch.org/five-
global-seed-banks-that-are-protecting-biodiversity/.
102. See Infra Part III.B.
103. Simran Sethi, Why Seed Banks Aren't the Only Answer to Food Security,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-busi-
ness/2015/nov/ 2 6/why-seed-banks-arent-the-only-answer-to-food-security.
13
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do not have the opportunity to respond or adapt to changing
environmental conditions or threats. 104
Svalbard clearly cannot completely solve the overreaching threat of
endangerment and extinction because as critical as this seed bank is, it
only stores agricultural seeds used for food production, not all wild
plant types. 0 5 It does not hold domestic or wild animal genetic
information to prevent their extinction.1 06  To combat such an
irreversible disservice to humanity as extinction, "Noah would need a
bigger boat."10 7 Regardless, Svalbard can still improve its depositor
agreement to enable it to reach its full potential in combatting food
extinction.
III. THE SVALBARD GLOBAL SEED VAULT'S DEPOSITOR AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE AMENDED
States and institutions sign a depositor agreement, which is
equivalent to a contract, with the Norwegian Ministry when they
deposit seeds into Svalbard. 0 8 The agreement refers to the depositor as
a holder of a unique seed collection important to humanity. 09 The
depositor, as stated in the agreement, deposits the seeds into Svalbard
to protect the long-term safety of seeds.11 0  In exchange for the
deposited seeds and the participation in Svalbard, Svalbard accepts all
financial responsibilities relevant to maintaining the deposited
materials. "
Syria's recent seed withdrawal from Svalbard presents the question
of whether seed bank facilities, even ones as great as Svalbard, will be
successful in the long-term.1 12 ICARDA requested the seeds on behalf
104. Id.
105. Carl Safina, THE VIEw FROM LAzY PoINT 198 (John Macrae Books, 1st
ed. 2012).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See generally Depositor Agreement, supra note 14.
109. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, at preamble.
110. Id.
111. Id. T 4.1(3).
112. See Gul Tuysuz & Arwa Damon, The "Doomsday Vault" Opens to Re-
trieve Vital Seeds for, CNN (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/19/eu-
rope/svalbard-global-seed-vault-syria/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
932016]
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of Syria to replace its own seed samples in its seed bank located near
Aleppo, Syria, which was damaged.' 13 Although a few scientists
remain at the Aleppo facility, it is now occupied by armed groups.114
The negative consequences of Syria's civil war are boundless; at
least 250,000 people have been killed and more than 11 million people
have been driven from their homes." 5 Property has also been a target
of the war, justifying ICARDA's necessity to relocate its seed bank
from Aleppo, Syria, to Beirut, Lebanon.11 6 In fact, the U.N. Security
Counsel created a resolution that condemns the destruction of cultural
heritage sites because of the high incidence of museum looting and
illegal excavation of archaeological sites occurring in Syria. "7
Specifically, ICARDA sought to retrieve 130 boxes out of the 325
it deposited in Svalbard, which contained a total of 116,000 seed
samples.' 18 Roughly 80,000 seed varieties from Syria's collection still
remain in Svalbard as a backup system for the world's seed
collections.11 9 However, it was not a natural disaster or apocalyptic
event that triggered the first ever withdrawal from Svalbard, as
envisioned at Svalbard's creation.1 20 Instead it was a typical manmade
tragedy-war.1 21 Indeed, ICARDA withdrew these seeds strictly for
research purposes and did not withdraw the seeds to actually feed
Syrians affected by the civil war.1 22 Scientists also predict that this
withdrawal will likely not be the last because seed diversity has been
113. Syria War Spurs P Withdrawal From 'Doomsday Bank, TIMES OF INDIA
(Sept. 23, 2015), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/Syria-war-
spurs-i st-withdrawal-from-doomsday-bank/articleshow/49068533.cms (last visited
Nov. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Syria War Spurs P' Withdrawal].
114. Alastair Jamieson, Syria War Forces First Withdrawal from Svalbard
Global Seed Vault, NBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-war-forces-first-withdrawal-artic-seed-
vault-n433471.
115. Syria War Spurs 1s' Withdrawal, supra note 113.
116. See S.C. Res. 2199 (Feb. 12, 2015).
117. Id.
118. Wagner, supra note 20.
119. Sethi, supra note 103.
120. Tuysuz & Damon, supra note 112; Gul Tuysuz & Arwa Damon, The
"Doomsday Vault" Opens to Retrieve Vital Seeds for Syria, CNN (Dec. 19, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/19/europe/svalbard-global-seed-vault-syria/.
121. Gul Tuysuz & Arwa Damon, supra note 120.
122. Syria War Spurs Is' Withdrawal, supra note 113.
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dramatically reduced during the past century, which may warrant future
withdrawals. 123
Svalbard was created as a back-up system, an insurance policy to
preserve seed varieties for future generations.1 24 From 2005-2012,
Gary Fowler served as Global Crop Diversity Trust Executive Director,
assisting in the creation of Svalbard.1 25 He stated: "I hope [countries]
never use Svalbard. It's an insurance policy. Like car or home
insurance, the hope is you never have to use it. Unfortunately, if we
need to go to Svalbard it means we suffered losses in the working gene
banks."l 26
In order to facilitate its goal, Svalbard should strengthen its current
contractual provisions in the depositor agreement. Foremost,
Svalbard's current depositor agreement allows arbitrary withdrawals,
which is contrary to Svalbard's mission. This article proposes two
alternative methods to strengthen Svalbard's depositor agreement.
First, the agreement should reduce a depositor's ability to withdraw the
seeds for foreseeable or State-caused disasters, especially when those
seeds are withdrawn for research and not to feed starving citizens or
assist displaced farmers. 127 This method would still permit the depositor
to maintain property rights over the seeds. Alternatively, the second
method proposed is Svalbard's depositor agreement should impose a
complete property transfer, enforcing an exchange of property rights
over the seeds from the depositor to Svalbard. These are only two
suggestions out of many feasible restrictions Svalbard could implement
to reduce future arbitrary withdrawals.
A. The Svalbard Global Seed Vault's Existing Depositor
Agreement does not Effecively Enforce its Purpose
Svalbard's current depositor contract permits States to freely
withdraw the deposited seeds at any time for any reason simply by
providing written notice. 128  This is flawed because it reduces
123. Sethi, supra note 103.
124. Reardon, supra note 10.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Syria War Spurs 1 Withdrawal, supra note 113.
128. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, T 3.3.
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Svalbard's ability to facilitate its goal to preserve seed varieties for
future generations.12 9
The Preamble, Subsection 4, of Svalbard's depositor agreement
provides: "[The Depositor] holds a collection of seeds of distinct plant
genetic resources of importance to humanity, and wishes to ensure the
long-term safety of its collection by depositing samples of that
collection in the Svalbard Global Seed Vault." The preamble sets forth
the common goals between Norway and the depositor to secure seeds
for the good of humanity.
"Responsibilities and Obligations of the Depositor," Section 3.3,
addresses the withdrawal of deposited materials. This section grants
the depositor the right to withdraw any amount of its deposited seed
samples upon providing written notice. 130 Section 3.3 provides:
3.3 Withdrawal of Deposited Materials
1. The Depositor shall have the right to withdraw all or any of its
Deposited Materials at any time on the giving of written notice.
2. Any written notice given under this Article shall identify the
individual boxes of Deposited Materials that are to be withdrawn.
3. The Ministry undertakes to return the Deposited Materials within
a period of one year from the date of receipt of such written notice.131
Additionally, Section 5.1 insists the act of depositing the seed does
not affect the property rights relating to the deposited seeds. 132 Under
this section, "General Provisions," the contract addresses property
rights over the deposited seeds:
5.1 Effect of the Deposit on Property Rights
1. The act of depositing the Deposited Materials in the Svalbard
Global Seed Vault shall have no effect whatsoever on the nature and
extent of any property rights pertaining to the Deposited Materials.
2. In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the above,
the act of deposit shall not act in any way to convey any property
129. See Gul Tuysuz & Arwa Damon, supra note 120.
130. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, ¶ 3.3.
13 1. Id.
132. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, ¶ 5.1.
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rights over the Deposited Materials to the Nordic Genetic Resource
Centre or the Ministry.1 33
The remainder of the contract includes provisions relevant to the
logistical exchange of the seeds and the manner in which Svalbard will
maintain the seeds under its control. 13 4 Those remaining provisions do
not otherwise effect the property rights over the seeds or the ability for
a State to withdraw its deposited materials. 135
Indeed, permitting arbitrary withdrawals can endanger the seeds.
When ICARDA withdrew seeds on behalf of Syria, ICARDA moved
the seeds from the safe halls of Svalbard to Beirut.1 3 6 Rather than going
to the struggling people of Syria, the seeds went to another seed bank
in Beirut to assist ICARDA scientists to continue their research on the
seeds. 137
Beirut, however, is still not a safe location to store these unique
seed varieties. 1 3 8 The people of Beirut have been toughened by fifteen
years of civil war followed by fifteen years of Syrian occupation and
several Israeli invasions. 13 9 Beirut was one of the many sites of the
deadly terrorist attacks in November 2015 when forty-three people
were killed. 14 0 More recently, the Syrian civil war has spilled over into
Beirut resulting in almost weekly bombings in January 2016.141
Therefore, Svalbard should not have permitted ICARDA's withdrawal
because the seeds are now in more danger than ever before, and there
are no backups in Svalbard for the withdrawn seeds.
Allowing States to freely withdraw deposited materials at any time
prevents Svalbard from meeting its true potential to preserve seeds for
133. Id.
134. See generally Depositor Agreement, supra note 14.
135. Id.
136. Wagner, supra note 20.
137. Jamieson, supra note 114.
138. See Anne Bernard, Beirut, Also the Site ofDeadly Attacks, Feels Forgotten,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/world/mid-
dleeast/beirut-lebanon-attacks-paris.html.
139. James Haines, Risky Cities: Beirut can Appear at Ease, But there's a Pal-
pable Sense of Dread, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/cities/2014/mar/26/risky-cities-beirut-ease-surface-sentiment-dread.
140. Bernard, supra note 138.
141. Haines, supra note 139.
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future generations. The depositor agreement provides no accountability
or regulation over withdrawals, making the deposited materials in
Svalbard impermanent. 142 Without limitations, every depositor can
withdraw every seed, leaving Svalbard as the empty cold mine from
once it was constructed. 143 Luckily, Svalbard currently contributes a
great deal to the fight against food extinction.14 But in order to cement
that impact, Svalbard should increase its regulation over future
withdrawals to create a secure, permanent collection rather than a
fleeting, possibly short-lived, collection of seeds.
B. The Svalbard Global Seed Vault's Depositor Agreement
Should be Amended to Limit Arbitrary Withdrawals
The provisions in the existing contract are insufficient to facilitate
Svalbard's goals set forth in the depositor agreement because the State's
ability to freely withdraw its deposit contradicts the common goals and
reasons for depositing seeds in the first place. The first possible
solution to fix the depositor agreement is to limit the circumstances
under which a State may withdraw its deposit. Specifically, Svalbard
should amend Section 3.3, regarding the depositor's ability to withdraw
seeds, to give the Norwegian Ministry a method to investigate and
decide whether it should permit the State to withdraw the seeds.1 45
Alternatively, a second possible solution to remedy the depositor
agreement requires a stricter transfer of property rights. Specifically,
Svalbard should amend Section 5.1, concerning the depositor's
property rights over the deposited seeds, to impose an exchange of
property rights over the seeds. 146 Both of these proposed alternative
amendments would limit arbitrary withdrawals, provide States with an
incentive to protect their own local or regional seed banks, and serve
Svalbard's mission to preserve food diversity for future generations.
142. See generally Depositor Agreement, supra note 14.
143. Id. ¶ 3.3; Russo, supra note 101.
144. See CRoPTRUST, supra note 15.
145. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, ¶ 3.3.
146. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, T 5.1.
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1. The Svalbard Global Seed Vault's Depositor Agreement
Should Limit the Depositor's Ability to Withdraw Deposited
Material
To limit a State's ability to withdraw seeds, Svalbard should
incorporate three different provisions to limit arbitrary withdrawals.
First, the depositor agreement should specifically stipulate and place a
cap on the percentage of the seeds a State may withdraw. Second, the
agreement should only permit withdrawals when States have a
legitimate necessity to withdraw seeds. And third, the Norwegian
Ministry, which owns Svalbard, 147 should consider the withdrawing
State's ability to maintain the seeds independently when it deliberates
approving a withdrawal request.
First, Section 3.3, concerning withdrawals, should specifically
stipulate the percentage of the seeds a State may withdraw. Rather than
stating the depositor shall rightfully withdraw any or all of its deposited
seeds, the contract should explicitly limit the portion of the seeds
eligible for withdrawal.1 48 For example: "In the event of a natural
disaster, the Depositor may request up to 50% of each variety of seeds
it deposited into Svalbard."1 49 This percentage condition would strike
the important, necessary balance between the parties because it ensures
the State must keep at least half of the seeds in Svalbard but it also
permits the State to withdraw a portion of its seeds.1 s0
Second, Svalbard should also revise Section 3.3 to limit the
circumstances under which a State may withdraw seeds. Natural
disasters regularly excuse a party's performance under a contract
because of their unforeseeable and devastating nature.151 In fact,
excusing a contractual duty in the face of an unanticipated and
unforeseeable supervening impediment is a widely accepted exception
to contract performance. 152 The natural disaster exception in contract
147. FAQ About the Seed Vault, supra note 95.
148. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, T 3.3.
149. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, ¶ 3.3.
150. See Jennifer S. Taub, Symposium: Contracts in the Real World: Essay: Un-
popular Contract and Why They Matter, WASH. L. REv 1427, 1461 (2013).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
152. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Discharge by Supervening Impractica-
bility, 104 A.L.R.6th 303.
2016] 99
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 1 [2017], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol47/iss1/4
100 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.47
law, however, does not excuse a contractual duty when the supervening
event was foreseeable.1 53
Therefore, Svalbard's depositor agreement should similarly not
permit withdrawals under foreseeable tragic events. 154 Accordingly,
Svalbard should have the ability to deny withdrawals deriving from
foreseeable and preventable events, for example war or other self-
induced consequences.155  Hypothetically, Svalbard could allow
withdrawals when other seed bank facilities are harmed or destroyed by
natural disasters. Under this amended depositor agreement, Svalbard
would most likely have denied ICARDA's request to withdraw the
seeds because the Aleppo facility was destroyed in a war. 156
Limiting opportunities for depositors or States to withdraw their
seeds ensures that seeds will only be withdrawn for legitimate reasons.
Svalbard is colloquially referred to as the "Doomsday Vault" because
it was established to safeguard seed diversity should an apocalyptic
event ever occur. 157 Svalbard's priority is to prevent the seeds from
extinction and it was not created to supplement a State or regional seed
bank for any and all reasons, including broken freezers or even war.158
Third, the Norwegian Ministry should also be selective when
approving withdrawal requests by analyzing the requesting State's
ability to maintain the seeds independently. For example, such a
provision may read as follows: "The Ministry shall determine if the
State or Institution has the resources, security, and means to receive a
return of the Deposited Materials." 59 The Norwegian Ministry could
then assess whether the requesting State has the ability to maintain and
preserve the unique seeds the parties are exchanging. Applying this
amended provision to ICARDA's withdrawal, Svalbard would have
denied ICARDA's request to withdraw its seeds because Beirut was not
a safe location at that time, and ICARDA was previously unable to
protect its seed banks from the Syrian war in Aleppo.1 60
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Jamieson, supra note 114.
157. Nuwer, supra note 9.
158. CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
159. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, ¶ 3.3.
160. See generally Haines, supra note 139; Jamieson, supra note 114.
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Consequently, these stricter contract provisions would also provide
States an incentive to protect their own seed banks. States would have
advance notice that minor failures, for example malfunctioning
freezers, do not warrant withdrawal from Svalbard, thus placing more
responsibility and accountability on those States. 16 1 These stricter
provisions would also incentivize States to house seed banks in safe,
isolated locations. For example, Syria would prioritize the protections
of its own seed banks, rather than relocating the destroyed bank to
another location that is also threatened by war and terrorism.1 62
Further, the humanitarian effects of denying withdrawals similar to
ICARDA's are limited. ICARDA intended to use its withdrawn seeds
to continue its research; the seeds were not withdrawn to feed the
population or assist displaced farmers.1 63 Therefore, a withdrawal in
such dangerous times to simply conduct further research contradicts the
purpose and long-term goals of Svalbard. On the other hand, if States
wish to withdraw seeds to feed its citizens or assist struggling farmers
with supplemental seeds, this severe need could potentially justify a
State withdrawing the seeds during unstable times.' 1 Therefore, the
intended purpose for withdrawing seeds could also be a factor in the
Norwegian Ministry's considerations when evaluating a State's seed
withdrawal request.
In conclusion, the proposed amended section concerning a State's
ability to withdraw their own seeds would read as follows:
3.3 Withdrawal of Deposited Materials
1. In the event of a natural disaster, the Depositor shall request up to
50% of each variety of seeds it deposited into Svalbard.
2. The Ministry shall investigate what caused the State's need to
withdrawal seeds.
3. The Ministry shall determine if the State or Institution has the
resources, security, and means to receive a return of the Deposited
Materials. 165
161. Tal Kastner, How 'Bout Them Apples?: The Power ofStories ofAgreement
in Consumer Contracts, 7 DREXEL L. REv. 67, 94 (2015).
162. See Haines, supra note 139.
163. See Syria War Spurs s' Withdrawal, supra note 113.
164. See U.N. on Food Production, supra note 2.
165. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, ¶ 3.3.
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2. Alternatively, The Svalbard Global Seed Vault's Depositor
Agreement Should Require Depositors to Forfeit All Property Rights
Over the Seeds
Alternative to changing the depositor agreement's regulation of
withdrawals, the agreement could change the implication of Section
5.1, regarding the effect of the depositor's property rights over the
seeds. Rather than explicitly stating the act of deposit does not have an
effect on property rights, as the agreement so states, 5.1 should make
an official transfer of property rights. For example, "The act of
depositing the Deposited Materials in the Svalbard Global Seed Vault
shall constitute a gift to mankind. The Depositor shall forfeit the
property rights pertaining to the Deposited Materials from the
Depositor to the Nordic Genetic Resource Centre and the Norwegian
Ministry."1 66
Forfeiting property rights over the seeds allows Svalbard to focus
on the greater picture: the maintenance of seed diversity, which is
consistent with international law. 167 In several international treaties,
international law explicitly acknowledges the goal of sustainable
development and the need for conservation and management of living
resources. 16 8  This duty of conservation and food security is
demonstrated through three sources of international law: international
treaties, general principles of international law, and customary
international law through State practice. 169
First, stricter contractual provisions in Svalbard's depositor
agreement that impose a transfer of property rights are consistent with
States' obligations under international treaties. This obligation is
demonstrated through treaties such as CITES, TPGRFA, and
ICESCR.1 70  TPGRFA is the international community's united
166. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, T 5.1.
167. See generally CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
168. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; Rio Declaration,
supra note 68.
169. See U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 ¶ 1,
June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S 993.
170. CITES, supra note 11; TPGRFA, supra note 12; ICESCR, supra note 73,
art. 12.
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recognition of the shared responsibility for food diversity. 17 1 The goal
of this treaty is to broaden the genetic base of crops and increase the
variety of genetic diversity available to farmers across the world. 172
The treaty also facilitates the exchange of the world's seeds and other
diverse genetic information, stimulating crucial research in the
development of climate-smart agriculture, and, thus, to food security as
well. 173
Second, the amended depositor agreement is consistent with
general principals of international law, which are to preserve seeds from
extinction. In fact, provisions relating to environmental conservation
have been added to the constitutions of approximately 130 countries,
including Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia,
East Timor, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Iraq, Macedonia, and
Panama. 174 These added constitutional provisions demonstrate States'
dedication to food conservation for our future generations.
Third, the amended depositor agreement is consistent with State
practice to combat all aspects of food security. For example, the
African Union mobilized E1 billion for food security.1 75 Spain's
government, during a 2009 conference, pledged C1 billion and sought
to get other countries to do the same. 176 Italy, the United States,
Australia, and many European nations began to forge the "L'Aguila
Initiative on Food Security," causing States to pledge more than
$20 billion towards developmental aid over the following years. 177 In
fact, new partnerships and cooperation were forming in the lead-up to
the food security summit in Rome, organized by the Food and
Agriculture Organization. 17 8
Consequently, limiting States' ability to withdraw will
automatically limit the total number of withdrawals from Svalbard,
which would greatly help the ultimate goal encompassed in
171. See TPGRFA, supra note 12.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Thomas G. Kelch, GLOBALIZATION AND ANIMAL LAW 288 (Ross Buckley
et al. eds., 2011).
175. U.N. on Food Production, supra note 2.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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international law: to improve environmental conservation efforts. 179 As
expressed earlier, seed diversity is severely threatened and its loss may
lead to a devastating food crisis. 80 Therefore, limiting withdrawals will
leave more seeds for future generations in the event of an extreme
natural disaster.
In conclusion, the proposed amended section concerning the
property rights over the deposited seeds would read as follows:
5.1 Effect of the Deposit on Property Rights
1. The act of depositing the Deposited Materials in the Svalbard
Global Seed Vault shall constitute a gift to mankind. The Depositor
shall forfeit the property rights pertaining to the Deposited Materials
from the Depositor to the Nordic Genetic Resource Centre and the
Norwegian Ministry.18 1
C. A Stricter Depositor Agreement will not Deter Depositors from
Contributing Seeds into the Svalbard Global Seed Vault
A primary concern for international law treaties is convincing
States to not only commit to the treaty, but also to comply with it.182
Introducing stricter provisions in Svalbard's contract would not reduce
States' incentives to deposit materials into Svalbard for three reasons.
First, the State's gains strongly outweigh the State's costs of depositing
seeds into Svalbard. Second, the amended depositor agreement
eliminates the possibility of any States free-riding other States'
contributions. And third, changing property rights is an increasing
practice and other seed banks across the world are implementing
alternative property transfers.
First, States respond well to the national costs and benefits that
accompany signing an international treaty or practice. 183  States
generally try to avoid the shame that accompanies not joining a treaty
179. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 168; Rio Declaration, supra note
68, at agenda 21.
180. See supra Part III.
181. See Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, T 5.1.
182. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory
ofInternational Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 493-94 (2005).
183. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument
Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 778 (1999).
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or practice. 184 The cost of depositing seeds into Svalbard is low: the
depositing State would only lose the fair market value of the seeds and
any possible shipment costs to Norway. After the deposit, Svalbard
accepts all financial responsibility relevant to maintaining the deposited
materials. 85 Thus, the cost of depositing the materials into Svalbard
greatly outweighs the potential shame or embarrassment of not
depositing seeds into Svalbard.
Second, a common issue for environmental regulation is the
concept of "free-riding," however, the free-riding problem would not
arise under the proposed amended depositor agreement. Typically,
many States refuse to participate in environmental agreements because
they assume other States will make enough of an effort so that they will
benefit from an environmentally improved world without carrying any
of the costs. 186 This is the "free-riding" problem, which also reflects
the traditional problem of the "tragedy of the commons," when a
country puts its own interests before the good of the world's. 18 7
Under Svalbard's stricter depositor agreement, however, States will
not be able to reap the environmental benefits of Svalbard without
individually depositing materials because they will not have any seeds
stored in Svalbard if/when an apocalyptic event occurs. Therefore,
strengthening Svalbard's depositor agreement would not reduce States'
incentive to participate, but rather assure the contributing States that
their deposited materials are truly benefiting the world and future
generations through an effective seed bank.18 8
Third, changing the agreement's provisions would be more
consistent with developing State practice regarding maintenance of
seed banks. For example, some regional seed banks have already begun
implementing similar alternative property transfers. 18 9  The
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, which
184. Id.
185. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, ¶ 4.1(3).
186. Laurence R. Helfer, Public International Law and Economics: Nonconsen-
sual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv 71, 83 (2008).
187. See David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 619, 652 (1994).
188. See Hathaway, supra note 182, at 516.
189. Faults in the Vault: Not Everyone is Celebrating Svalbard, GRAIN (Feb.
26, 2008), https://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/181-faults-in-the-vault-not-every-
one-is-celebrating-svalbard.
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manages fifteen global banks for the world's most widely used staple
food crops, has set up a legal arrangement of trusteeship.1 90 It exercises
this trusteeship over the farmers' seeds that it holds on behalf of the
international community. 191 This shows changing property rights is an
increasing practice and other seed banks across the world are
implementing alternative property transfers despite any consequences
to States' incentive to participate.
IV. CONCLUSION
By incorporating the recommended contractual changes, Svalbard
could be better equipped to fulfill its mission and preserve the myriad
of seed varieties for the future generations of the world. However, even
with a stricter depositor agreement, Svalbard still faces several
obstacles before it can effectively act as the insurer to the world's
collection of seeds. 192
As is the case with all seed banks, Svalbard is not perfect. Seed
banks, even ones as expansive as Svalbard, do not have the resources
or capacity to preserve the entire world's collection of foods. 193
Another flaw previously addressed is that Svalbard saves the seeds
under stable environmental conditions and the seeds cannot develop the
ability to adapt to changing. environmental conditions or threats.1 94
Therefore, the seeds cannot evolve with the world's shifting
conditions. 195
Further, Svalbard's reach is limited. It is clear that Svalbard cannot
completely solve the extinction threat because as critical as Svalbard is,
it will store only agricultural seeds. 196 In an ideal world, global banks
large enough to securely store all types of genetic materials would be
built and managed to preserve the future of all living creatures.
Despite the obstacles it faces, Svalbard is still making an
impressive effort to preserve seed diversity to protect our world from
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Sethi, supra note 103.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Safina, supra note 107, at 105.
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potential food crises. 19 7 Indeed, the international community must start
implementing additional measures to prevent seed extinction because
this problem is a global issue.
Unfortunately, future generations will inherit plenty of the world's
current issues, but we must draw a line for generational accountability.
It is immoral for our generation to force coming generations to deal with
the consequences of our food production mistakes. 198 Further, holding
the future generation of the world captive to our present economy, is,
in effect, choosing to hold the moral low ground. 199 And, finally, it is
not moral to tolerate seed extinction and the reduction of seed diversity.
International law relating to restitution for environmental damage
remains undeveloped, as shown by the general lack of legal precedents
regarding this field of extinction accountability and liability. 2 0 0 If
International tribunals are not going to hold States criminally
responsible for extinction, States must at least be made duty-bound to
employ measures and practices to prevent extinction. Depositing seeds
into Svalbard demonstrates a dedication to preventing extinction.201 As
the European Commission recognized in its Green Paper on
Environmental Liability, "An identical reconstruction may not be
possible, of course. An extinct species cannot be replaced." 202 That is
why food extinction is such a severe harm; its damages are everlasting,
potentially affecting every future generation that is deprived of that
particular extinct food variety. 203
197. CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
198. Safina, supra note 105, at 198.
199. Id.
200. Philippe Sands, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 1 REV. EC & INT' L ENV. L. 270, 275 (1992).
201. Depositor Agreement, supra note 14, at preamble.
202. Communication from the European Community Commission to the Euro-
pean Community Council and European Parliament on Environmental Liability, p. 32
(1993); Jonathan Goldberg, An Uncertain Future: Retroactivity, Insurance, and the
EC's Attempts at Environmental Liability Legislation, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 685, 713
(1993).
203. CROPTRUST, supra note 15.
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In conclusion, these proposed amendments to Svalbard's depositor
agreement are only one of the many steps the international community
should take to walk the world away from the threat of seed extinction.
Ciara Ryan*
* I would like to thank Professor Finkmoore for helping me prepare this Comment
for publication, and Professor Aceves for being a constant source of mentorship and
inspiration. Above all, I wish to dedicate this piece to my parents for their support, to
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